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On pre-conventions as ‘normative
facts’
Luís Duarte d’Almeida
1 Bruno Celano’s ambitious paper opens with the following statement:
I will argue that there are entities that can be plausibly called ‘conventions’, which
are neither mere de facto regularities, nor rules (norms), but that – in a sense to be
specified – have both the character of de facto regularities, as well as a normative
character: they are, literally, ‘normative facts’. (Celano 2016: 9)
2 This  passage  contains  several  distinct  claims.  First,  we  have  what  sounds  like  a
metaphysical claim: that “there are entities” of a certain sort. Second, a negative claim
about these putative entities: that they are not de facto regularities, and that they are not
rules or norms. And third, a positive claim that also helps readers to understand the
second claim more clearly;  it  is  the  claim that  those  entities  have both  a normative
character and the character of de facto regularities: which must mean, I gather, that what I
called the ‘second’ claim is really to be understood as the claim that those entities are
neither de facto regularities as opposed to norms, nor norms as opposed to de facto regularities
.
3 Throughout his paper, Celano does not carefully differentiate among these claims. But
not all arguments that might justify the first claim would also support the second or the
third.  The  claims  are  also  not  all  equally  important.  The  third  is  philosophically
interesting, and Celano knows it. That is probably why he pitches his essay as an attempt
to show that the ‘entities’ he is concerned with, his ‘pre-conventions’, are entities of a
“peculiar sort” (as he says in his abstract) that somehow straddle the commonly accepted
distinction between facts and norms (Celano 2016: 9–10). That is a bold thesis; but it is one
for which Celano gives us no good argument. As to the first and the second of his claims,
Celano does mention some considerations that support them; but the claims themselves
are not particularly striking, and Celano does not purport to have fresh arguments in
their favor. Overall, then, the substantive views that Celano wants to press in this regard
–  I  leave  to  one  side  his  discussions  of  Bourdieu,  Foucault,  Wittgenstein,  and  other
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authors – come across as either unpersuasive or relatively ineffectual; or so I will suggest
in this commentary.
4 Here is how Celano describes the kind of ‘entities’ he has in mind:
[T]he entities that I am trying to isolate are ‘tacit’ conventions, ‘tacit’ in the sense of
automatic: regular convergent behavior that, while not a biological regularity (e.g.),
is spontaneous, unreflective, fast, fluid, effortless. (Celano 2016: 12)
5 He  also  speaks  of  such  entities  as  “embodied”  conventions  (Celano  2016:  13),
“conventions – to use yet another metaphor – that are part of the body, in the flesh, so to
speak, and have become as natural as breathing, a ‘second nature’” (Celano 2016: 12). The
idea becomes clearer when Celano illustrates it with examples of actions such as riding a
bike,  or swimming in a certain style,  as  performed by people who have learned and
acquired the  relevant  skills  to  the  extent  that  they are  now able  to  do  such things
automatically.  The agents’  learning processes  may have at  first  required a  conscious
grasp of, and an intentional effort to follow or apply, certain rules; but there comes a
point at which, as Searle puts it in a passage that Celano quotes, those rules “recede into
the background”, and the body “takes over”:
As the skier gets better he does not internalize the rules better, but rather the rules
become progressively irrelevant. The rules do not become ‘wired in’ as unconscious
Intentional  contents,  but  the  repeated  experiences  create  physical  capacities,
presumably  realized as  neural  pathways,  that  make the rules  simply irrelevant.
‘Practice makes perfect’ not because practice results in a perfect memorization of
the rules, but because repeated practice enables the body to take over and the rules
to recede into the Background . . . On my view, the body takes over and the skier’s
Intentionality is concentrated on winning the race. (Searle 1983: 150–151)
6 Searle is offering an account (an alternative to what he calls the “traditional cognitivist
view”) of  how it  is  that we come to acquire and develop such physical  skills  and to
perform many actions,  as  we do,  automatically:  “repeated practice and training in a
variety of situations eventually makes the causal functioning of [explicit] representation
[e.g. of verbal instructions of what one is supposed to do] unnecessary in the exercise of
the skill” (Searle 1983: 151). Searle’s point, then, is an explanatory point about how such
types of behavior come to emerge, and about the role – the causal role – played by rules,
and by rule-learning, in that process. It also seems clear that the relevant rules – the rules
of  skiing or swimming – are,  for  the most  part,  as  Celano points out,  arbitrary,  and
accepted by certain groups of people who regularly engage in the relevant activities; they
are therefore ‘conventional’ in one sense of the word.
7  Such  conventions  that  have  receded  into  the  “background  of  our  activities  and
thoughts”, and which, “passing usually unnoticed, delimit their [i.e. our activities’ and
thoughts’] spaces”, are what Celano proposes to call ‘pre-conventions’ (Celano 2016: 19).
So do pre-conventions “exist” – which is Celano’s first claim? There do seem to be many
actions which are (a) not biological regularities, (b) the outcome of learning processes,
and  (c)  actions  that  we  do  come,  with practice,  to  perform  automatically  and
spontaneously. It also seems plausible to think that arbitrary conventions may and do
feature prominently in such learning processes, and that, with practice, such conventions
do “recede” into the “background” and come to pass “unnoticed”. So the answer would
appear to be that, yes, pre-conventions do exist. What I do not see is that by pointing this
out, Celano is adding anything very much to the points already made by Searle and others
in the works that he quotes.
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8  But that is not, of course, the full extent of Celano’s claims. He does not merely say that
pre-conventions exist; he suggests that pre-conventions enjoy a distinctive metaphysical
status not easy to square with the idea that there is an exclusive divide between (non-
normative) facts and norms. His insistence that a pre-convention is an “embodied norm”
(Celano 2016: 18, 29), or his description of pre-conventions as “embodied . . . normative
facts” (Celano 2016: 12) and also as “abstract entities” which are nevertheless “in the body
”  (Celano  2016:  14),  all  seem  meant  to  carry  precisely  that  suggestion  across:  the
suggestion that pre-conventions are metaphysically “peculiar entities” in which body and
rule, fact and norm, are irreducibly entwined.
9  It seems to me, however, that Celano is too quick to run together (sometimes in the same
breath) two different distinctions. One is the distinction between de facto regularities and
rules; another is the distinction between (non-normative) facts and norms. Consider the
following passage:
Philosophers  usually  distinguish,  and  with  good  reason,  between  rules  and
regularities, between facts and norms. In each pair, the two concepts are thought of
as mutually exclusive. The distinction is intuitive, and it appears, at first sight at
least, incontrovertible. (Celano 2016: 9)
10 Although he does not state it in so many words, Celano comes across as meaning to imply
that the existence of pre-conventions upsets the view that these two distinctions are
indeed mutually exclusive. Remember Celano’s opening paragraph: he asserts that pre-
conventions have both the character of de facto regularities,  and normative character.
Taken literally, this sounds intriguing – and Celano does want us to take him literally:
pre-conventions, he says, “are, literally, ‘normative facts’”.  (Oddly, the adverb clashes
with his use of quotation marks around “normative facts”.) But what does he give us by
way of argument to support such a view? Not very much, as far as I can see. He does avail
himself of several metaphors, and he is particularly fond of Searle’s “the body takes over”
phrase. But he goes on, I think, to mischaracterize Searle’s point:
The central idea is aptly captured by the phrase the body takes over. What the body is
doing,  from now on,  is  not  a  mere de facto regularity,  but  something that  is  in
between a norm and a regularity. (Celano 2016: 15)
11 This is dangerously equivocal. It may be true that what the body is doing once the rules
“recede into the Background” is not a mere de facto regularity. But it does not mean that
what we now have is a non-factual, or not wholly factual, ‘entity’. De facto regularities are
facts, not norms; but it does not follow that every ‘entity’ which is not a de facto regularity
is  not  a  factual  ‘entity’,  or  that  it  must  fall  somewhere  “in  between a  norm and  a
regularity”. Celano sometimes makes it sound as if what matters is that, when activities
such as skiing or marching or swimming do become, with practice, “second nature”, one
has embodied the correct way of doing such things (Celano 2016: 14–15). But the correct
front crawl stroke – not any token stroke, but the abstract action-type – is something one
can identify regardless of whether one ever tries to learn how to swim the front crawl;
and it will not become an ‘entity’ of a different sort (e.g. an “embodied diagram”: Celano
2016:  14)  simply  because  we  have  come,  through  learning  and  practice,  to  become
proficient at swimming the front crawl correctly to the point that it became “second
nature”. (It is also possible for us – even all of us – to become unintentionally proficient at
swimming the front crawl incorrectly. ‘Practice’ may make us ‘perfect’ at doing the action
we practice; but the action we become perfect at doing may not be the perfect action –
the ‘correct’ action.)
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12  It may be true that, as Searle points out (and as Celano points out that Searle points out),
participants in institutional activities develop tendencies, dispositions and skills that are
“functionally equivalent” to the systems of rules of the relevant institutions:
The basic idea /.../ is that one can develop, one can evolve, a set of abilities that are
sensitive to specific structures of intentionality without actually being constituted
by intentionality. One develops skills and abilities that are, so to speak, functionally
equivalent to the system of rules, without actually containing any representations
or internalizations of those rules. (Searle 1995: 142)
13 But this, again, despite what Celano suggests, is not the same as saying that “here /.../
entities  intermediate  between  rules  and  regularities,  embodied  norms  /.../  emerge”
(Celano  2016:  29).  We  should  avoid  conflating  (a)  claims  about  how it  is  that  pre-
conventions may come to emerge (and the role that arbitrary rules may play in that
causal process), (b) claims about the “functional” role of pre-conventions, and (c) claims
about their metaphysical status.
14  My point, to put it differently, is that there is no sense – let alone its literal sense – of
Celano’s “normative fact” phrase in which it can both plausibly refer to pre-conventions,
and track a kind of ‘entity’ whose existence would be incompatible with the standard
view that there is a mutually exclusive distinction between (non-normative) facts and
norms. Or if there is, Celano has said nothing to show that that is the case. Since he does
strongly come across as thinking that pre-conventions are indeed ‘normative facts’ in a
suitably robust sense of the phrase, it seems to me that he has failed to discharge his
argumentative burdens. And if,  on the other hand, this is not quite the sort of thesis
Celano wanted to  defend,  then he should not  only have been more careful  to  avoid
suggesting  otherwise,  but  also  much  more  precise  about  what  it  is  that  he  takes  a
‘normative fact’ to (‘literally’) be. 
–Acknowledgment. – I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Revus for helpful comments.
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ABSTRACTS
In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse
three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: (a) that such ‘entities’ exist; (b) that they are
neither  rules  nor  de  facto regularities;  and  (c)  that  their  ‘character’  is  at  once  factual  and
On pre-conventions as ‘normative facts’
Revus, 33 | 2017
4
normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that (a) and (b) are
not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for (c) is unpersuasive.
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